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Preface 
This document contains the research findings for the Work Packages 4 and 5 of the Belgian part of 
INSPIRES. The European FP7 programme INSPIRES (http://www.inspires-research.eu/) gathers and 
analyses current practices which qualify as policy learning in the domain of labour market policy. Part 
1 of this report responds to the Work Package 4, selecting 5 policy innovations and looking at the 
drivers for them. Part 2 narrows the focus to policy learning properly in three of these cases. The data 
were gathered through document study and interviews with relevant stakeholders. Due to agreements 
with the interviewees, the attribution of which specific answers were revealed by which interviewee 
cannot be disclosed. Conclusive statements used in this report have however been subject to 
triangulation. 
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1. In depth analysis of the implementation of policy innovations in 
Belgium (WP4) 
1.1. Introduction to the policy innovations 
Continuing on the data gathering for the Work Packages 2 and 3 of the INSPIRES project in Belgium, 
this paper focuses on labour market policy innovations which may hold important lessons for insight 
into the mechanisms and the practice of policy learning (Van Dooren et al., 2013; Van Dooren et al., 
2014). 
The context in Belgium is marked by repeated warnings from the EU to Belgium to keep its annual 
budget deficit below 3% of its GDP. European Semester has been explicit in the request for structural 
measures which would have a direct effect on revenues, expenditures and economic growth at large. 
As the INSPIRES WP3 Belgium Report explained, Belgium suffers from below-average and stagnating 
labour market participation and high (un)employment disparities across regions and population 
subgroups (Van Dooren et al., 2014, p.12). This low labour market participation comes with a 
considerable macro-economic cost. 
This means that from a relevance point of view, the measures selected for this component (WP4) of 
INSPIRES should target labour market participation of subgroups understood to be particularly 
problematic. However, macro-economic and social relevance are not the only selection criteria. The 
measures chosen should also feature an innovative element and be evidence-based. In Belgium, this 
is not necessarily a forthcoming proposition. Policy makers tend to be dug in along leftist-rightist as 
well as federalist-regionalist divides, often limiting the manoeuvring space to honourable 
compromises rather than shared evidence-based insights. Moreover, most knowledge producers 
(including academia) are considered to belong to an ideological pillar, resulting in neutral expertise 
being left to just a handful of institutions (such as the National Bank and the Planbureau) and short-
lived specialised ad hoc committees. That does not mean that evidence and expertise would be 
completely absent in policy making. The policy innovations in this paper will show, however, that 
evidence is more often than not inseparably tied to other factors, such as power, ideology, tradition 
and the influence of street-level institutions. 
The abrupt school to work transition and the legacy of early retirement schemes have been described 
in the WP3 deliverable (Van Dooren, 2014, p.20-22) as bottlenecks that have notably triggered policy 
innovation and inventiveness (Hoj, 2013, p.16). The five measures selected in this paper therefore refer 
to the young (-25) and older employed or unemployed persons (50+). 
In sections 1.2.1 to 1.2.3 the cases are introduced including the particular motivation as to why they 
were selected. Section 1.2.4 gives an analytic presentation of each of the innovations, including the 
timeline, the factors leading to it, the actors involved, the (expected) impact and the knowledge 
infrastructure either used or underused. Section 1.2.5 reprises the key-variables and how they unfold 
in the five innovations. Section 1.3 assesses in a narrative way the influence exercised from the key-
variables on the performance of the respective innovations. A fourth section summarises these 
findings in a conclusive format.  
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1.2. Analytic description of the selected innovations 
1.2.1. Selected innovations 
Table 1.2.1. – Overview of the selected innovations 
Innovation Description (and reference in Annex 1 of WP3) Target group 
Innovation I: 
Reform of the 
pension age 
regime 
In Belgium several measures have been taken to increase the actual age 
at retirement.  Between 1997 and 2009, the female retirement age was 
gradually aligned with the male one. In 2009, the statutory pension 
scheme for women was aligned with that of men by raising the statutory 
retirement from 60 to 65 years and extending the length of working 
career to qualify for a full pension from 40 to 45 years. Several early 
retirement systems (early retirement, pré-pension) which enabled 
workers to retire before the legal age of retirement have been reformed 
by tightening up access conditions. By mid-2014, the newly formed 
federal government decided to also lift the legal retirement age from 65 
to 67. (4)  
 
Older 
workers 
Innovation II: 
Employment 
plan for elderly 
workers at 
company level 
Since 2013, it is agreed that any company with more than 20 employees 
have to establish an action plan, containing measures, to maintain or 
increase the numbers of workers aged 45 or older in a company. The 
action plan should be tailored according to the company’s size and 
activity and to the extent it aims to maintain or increase the employment 
of aged workers. (5) 
 
Older 
workers 
Innovation III: 
Monitoring job 
search scheme 
(as applied for 
50+; the so-
called 
‘adapted’ 
availability) 
Since the introduction of a new monitoring job search effort scheme in 
2004 (and the reform in 2012) the receipt of unemployment benefits is 
more closely linked to active job seeking. Job seekers are closely 
monitored in their job search and have to prove they are actively 
searching for work. 
The programme starts with a notification letter, sent to the jobseeker, to 
remind him/her that she must be actively seeking employment. 
Afterwards, a series of interviews follow, where past job search effort is 
evaluated on the basis of proof delivered by the jobseeker. If a jobseeker 
gets a negative evaluation, an action plan is prepared outlining the next 
steps to be taken. Sanctions may apply to unemployed if their efforts 
seem to be insufficient or in case of non-compliance. This can include 
temporary reduction, suspension or permanent cessation of benefit 
payments. The 2012 reform reformed and intensified the follow-up of 
jobseekers, especially the follow-up on older and younger unemployed. 
As it appeared by October 2014, the newly formed federal government 
of Prime Minister Michel had planned to apply this search scheme for 
older unemployed persons, not just for ‘ordinary’ unemployed persons 
but those unemployed due to collective redundancies. The concept 
‘adapted availability’ was proposed for the latter. The idea was that a 
person in this group was to apply for suitable jobs, in compliance with 
his/her customised plan. The plan, which is to be provided within 6 
months after being made redundant, may also include training or 
outsourcing. (19) 
 
Older 
unemployed 
Innovation IV: 
Non-response 
pilots (as a 
step-up to 
Youth 
The Flemish PES (VDAB) collaborated in nine pilots with coaches of local 
private non-profit social work partners familiar with the group of hard to 
reach young jobless people to (1) reach out to the target group by 
searching them proactively in the city, and (2) support them in their 
(re)insertion in the labour market. These young people were to receive 
Young 
unemployed  
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Employment 
Plan) 
the whole package of services – intensive coaching, job hunting and 
mediation, job coaching even after finding employment – from one 
coach to enable them to build trust in their coach. The different phases 
could overlap and be repeated; it was not meant as a linear pathway. 
The expertise from partners in different policy domains were brought 
together and innovative techniques and instruments were used: 
outreach strategies and attention was paid to the removal of non-
employment related barriers like welfare issues or housing problems.(28) 
 
Innovation V: 
Integration 
allowance 
(reform of the 
waiting 
allowance) 
Waiting allowances are a specific form of unemployment allowances 
granted to young school leavers in Belgium who never worked and 
consequently never contributed to the unemployment benefit system. 
They can receive a waiting benefit after a certain “waiting period” 
(unpaid period between leaving education and receiving the 1st 
allowance).The benefits are lump sums depending on their age and 
family situation, and are only slightly above the level of social assistance 
benefits.  
The reform of the waiting allowance in 2012 tightened the eligibility 
conditions for this benefit to strengthen job search incentives and 
prevent abuse of the measure: (1) The “waiting period” has been 
extended from 6,9,12 months (depending on age) to 12 months for all 
new applicants. (2) The duration of the benefit (previously unlimited) has 
been limited to three years, although there are some exceptions. (3) The 
benefit is restricted to under 30 years old.  
The waiting period has been renamed into professional integration 
period while “waiting allowances” turned into “integration allowances”.  
The Michel government (2014) further restricted the criteria for 
obtaining an integration allowance. (9) 
 
Young 
unemployed 
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1.2.2. Selection criteria or rationale 
The criteria used for selecting the cases are on the one hand the relevance they hold in terms of 
adjusting the Belgian labour market to the desired shape and quality, and on the other hand the 
innovative character they appear to demonstrate. 
Relevance here means that the selected policy measures had the ambition to generate a solution for 
recurring problems in the Belgian labour market. The context is relatively low labour market 
participation of certain groups, with people settling into unemployment or early retirement schemes. 
The selected measures therefore fall under activation. The ‘problem groups’ the measure targets are 
young unemployed persons, given the abrupt school to work transition, and older workers and 
unemployed persons, given the legacy of early retirement schemes. The other ‘problem group’, i.e. 
those with a migrant background, has not been selected because the debate on migrant workers’ 
participation in the Belgian labour market is heavily contaminated by the stance of a right-wing political 
party having monopolised this issue over the years. 
Whether the selected measures would be an example of innovation and hold policy learning potential 
is to some extent subject to speculation at the time of selection. We considered however that most 
insight is not to be gained by ‘best practices’, but by cases demonstrating how innovation and evidence 
can play a role aside from (or in competition with) other drivers such as power, ideology or tradition. 
We therefore have chosen cases with a history, and cases that together represent the diversity of 
policy measures: cases at federal level or at regional (Flemish) level; cases with compulsory or with 
solely guiding regulation, and -importantly - cases suggesting different levels of learning through the 
order of changes they cover. Hall (1993, p. 281) makes a distinction between first-order changes (at 
the level of policy instrument settings), second-order changes (at the level of policy instruments 
themselves) and third-order changes (at the level of the overarching goals). Whereas first-order 
changes could be qualified as operational and second-order changes as strategic, third-order changes 
hold a paradigmatic element. 
Presented as a matrix: 
Table 1.2.2. - Selection criteria 
Target 
group 
Federal (Belgian) level Regional (Flemish) level 
Older Innovation I: Reform of the pension age 
regime 
- Compulsory 
- Changes at instrument level 
(strategic) 
Innovation II: Employment plan for older 
workers at company level 
- Guiding 
- Changes at goal level (paradigmatic) 
Innovation III: Monitoring job search 
scheme (as applied to 50+; the so-called 
‘adapted’ availability) 
- Compulsory 
- Changes at settings level 
(operational) 
Young Innovation V: Integration allowance (reform of 
the waiting allowance) 
- Compulsory 
- Changes at settings level 
(operational) 
Innovation IV: Non-response pilots (as a 
step-up to Youth Employment Plan) 
- Guiding 
- Changes at instrument level 
(strategic) 
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Innovations 1, 3 and 4 will be converted into the cases we will elaborate on in light of policy learning 
in Part 2 of this report. These three measures are not isolated in the moment of their design but should 
be understood through the history of approaches to the issue they respond to. The interaction 
between policy and evidence has played a significant role in the creation of these measures as well as 
in the form they have taken. 
1.2.3. Table presentation of the selected cases 
Table 1.2.3 Characterisation of the selected cases 
Innovation Goals Target 
groups 
Level Type of 
measure 
Type of 
strategies 
Expected 
impact 
Innovation I: Reform 
of the pension age 
regime 
Retention of employees 
& financial sustainability 
of pension system 
 
Older 
workers 
Federal 
(Belgium) 
Law Structural Labour 
market 
participatio
n rate & 
budget 
Innovation II: 
Employment plan for 
older workers at 
company level 
Retention of employees 
through workability 
 
Older 
workers 
Federal 
(Belgium) 
Collective 
Agree-
ment 
Creating 
conditions for 
local 
implementation 
Workability 
Innovation III: 
Monitoring job 
search scheme (as 
applied to 50+; the 
so-called ‘adapted’ 
availability) 
Integration of older 
unemployed into the 
labour market 
(activation) 
Older 
unem-
ployed 
Federal + 
Regional 
(Flemish) / 
Devolution 
Regula-
tion 
Activating a 
described 
category 
Employ-
ability 
Innovation IV: Non-
response pilots (as a 
step-up to Youth 
Employment Plan) 
Integration of NEET 
youths (not in 
employment, education 
of training) into the 
labour market 
(activation) 
Young 
unem-
ployed  
Flemish 
region 
Pilots 
(experime
ntal) 
 
Creating a 
methodological 
frame 
Prevention 
of 
deprivation 
/ 
Employ-
ability 
Innovation V: 
Integration 
allowance (reform of 
the waiting 
allowance) 
Integration of 
graduates/drop-outs into 
the labour market 
(activation) 
Young 
unem-
ployed 
Federal 
(Belgium) 
Law Activating a 
described 
category 
Unemploym
ent ‘trap’ / 
Employ-
ability 
  
10 
 
1.2.4. Analytic presentation of each innovation 
In this chapter we identify the main parameters and the Belgian or Flemish (regional) peculiarities that 
affected the development, implementation and performance of the selected innovations. Each 
innovation will be introduced by a short summary. Further on, the narrative will cover the historical 
background, the drivers of the innovation, the format and implementation, the perceptions on 
effectiveness and impact, and - foreshadowing the policy learning part - a brief assessment of the 
measure’s degree of innovativeness and its contribution to a more resilient and inclusive labour 
market. 
Innovation I: Reform of the pension age regime 
In a nutshell 
After years of debate and attempts to raise the actual retirement age so that it corresponds with the 
legal retirement age, the new Belgian federal government (‘Michel 1’) decided to raise the legal 
retirement age to 66/67 (by 2025/2030). This came as a surprise as it was not announced in the 
electoral programmes of the coalition partners. The rationale of the measure has been subject to 
controversy and speculation ever since. 
Background 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the end-of-career debate was part of the larger debate on 
unemployment. It was felt that older workers were blocking opportunities for the young who entered 
the labour market. Collective redundancies in the so-called ‘old industries’ (steel and textile) provided 
the opportunity to launch early retirement schemes, based upon collective agreements at sector or 
company level. 
By the 1990s, the debate was disconnected from the unemployment issue and moved towards the 
ageing issue. Doubts about the financial sustainability of the pension system were already 
pronounced. Employees were encouraged to make sure their retirement would be secured by adding 
private pension schemes to the legal pension they are entitled to. But more fundamentally, it was felt 
that people would have to work longer. This was an element of the active welfare state concept. Based 
to some extent on the experiences of the Blair Administration in the UK, the then Minister of Work 
Frank Vandenbroucke thought the employment rate of people older than 50 was to increase 
dramatically in order to preserve the pension system for future generations (Vandenbroucke, 1999; 
Vandenbroucke, 2000). These ideas and reflections were subject to negotiations between the social 
partners, who procrastinated so long that in 2005 the federal government (Verhofstadt II) decided to 
launch a package of measures which would become known as the Generation Pact. Measures included 
an incremental raising of the early retirement age (to 60), bringing in the condition of actual career 
length in addition to age, re-entry incentives for older unemployed persons, additional compensation 
from the employer for redundant employees who are not entitled to early retirement (the so-called 
Canada Dry arrangement), pension bonus for those who continue working after pension age, 80% part-
time schemes for 50+/55+ employees, etc. The measures, however low the proposed standards, led 
to social unrest which brought the social partners to an agreement that watered down much of the 
Generation Pact (e.g. lowering the early retirement age to 56 again by 2011). 
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The effectiveness of the Generation Pact was severely questioned, not just by the European 
Commission (stating in 2008 that the Belgian employment rate for 55-64 year olds was 35% compared 
to the EU average of 45%), but also by labour market researchers (Denys, 2006; Bevers & Van Thuyne, 
2009) and official study commissions (Federal Plan Bureau, 2010). 
It was noticed that early retirement schemes remained popular in company or sector-specific collective 
agreements and that the principle of actual career length was undermined by so-called equivalent 
periods (career breaks, unemployment periods, etc.). However, re-entry incentives and the stipulation 
that rights would not be lost in the case of re-employment gone wrong were evaluated as a positive 
aspect. Learning from the observation that the social partners did not make much progress in 
increasing the employment rate for 55-64 year olds, the Di Rupo Administration (2011-2014) usurped 
the issue, leading to a ‘Generation Pact Bis’. This new set of measures included that early retirements 
coming from collective redundancies would still be granted from the age of 52, while those coming 
from collective agreements would have to be 60. Individual applications for early retirement would 
only be considered from the age of 62. The Generation Pact Bis was meant to accelerate the pace of 
raising the actual retirement age. Still, budget austerity pundits were not happy. Existing collective 
agreements did not fall under this regulation. While in 1999 the average age at retirement for male 
Flemish employees was 58.8, the average age in 2013 was 59.8. The employment rate of the age group 
55-64 in Flanders was still only 43.3% in 2014, compared to 60% in the Netherlands and 64% in 
Germany (figures from Steunpunt WSE). The majority of people retired early, claiming rights from 
collective agreements signed in the past as still significant. 
Meanwhile the Europe 2020 strategy for employment had set the target for a 75% employment rate 
for the active population (age 20 to 65), 60% for the 50+ segment and 50% for the 55+ segment, still a 
long way to go for Belgium (as for the Flemish region). The European Commission’s Country Specific 
Recommendations for Belgium held the urgent call to markedly increase the effective retirement age. 
The tone sharpened year by year. In 2011, the recommendation was to prevent early exit from the 
labour market (European Commission, 2011). In 2013, it recommended stepping up efforts to close 
the gap between effective and statutory retirement age (European Commission, 2013). In 2014, it 
added the recommendation to promote activation ageing in order to align the statutory retirement 
age to changes in life expectancy (European Commission, 2014). 
Given this sense of urgency and the political controversy, the Di Rupo federal government installed a 
Commission for Pension Reform, of which the Socialist Frank Vandenbroucke was the most prominent 
member. By June 2014, while a new federal government was in the making, this commission presented 
an impressive report, pleading for a shift from physical age to career length as a criterion in 
determining the moment of retirement, the right to retire earlier and the pension rates (Commission 
for Pension Reform, 2014). However, the report also suggested that - notwithstanding a great many 
reservations and accompanying measures - the legal retirement age could be raised to 66 in 2025 and 
67 in 2030. (Commission for Pension Reform, 2014, p.182).This was quickly picked up by the 
conservative press (e.g. Trends, 2014) and conservative think-tanks (De Vos, 2014). Earlier that year, 
the VOKA (Flemish employers) Memorandum had proposed the idea of raising the pension age to 67 
(VOKA, 2014, p.21). 
In October 2014, the new federal government, consisting of coalition partners of the political centre-
right, announced its programme, in which the Pension Reform would constitute one of the main 
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components. The retirement age was set at 66 by 2025 and 67 by 2030. Early retirement on individual 
basis would by 2018 only be possible at the age of 63. Collectively bargained early retirement would 
be lifted to 60 by 2017. The measure received positive feedback from the employers’ side and fierce 
resistance - to the point of strikes and manifestations - from the trade unions. The government had to 
master a social crisis by delegating an exemptions negotiation to the social partners, specifically for 
the current stock of early retirees and for determining the category of heavy labour. This process is 
still on-going at the time of writing. 
Drivers 
When analysing the drivers of a particular measure, we make a distinction between the rationale, i.e. 
the reasons in terms of societal problems to be solved, and the motives of the respective actors. The 
rationale is three-fold. Firstly, the employment rate of the 50+ segment was to be increased because 
the financial sustainability of the pension system is a function of the pensioners/workers equation. 
Secondly, and in line with the first, longer life expectancy comes with higher costs (pensions, housing 
and health care) to be provided by the taxpayers. So raising the pension age to 67 will immediately 
reduce those costs. Thirdly, postponing the retirement horizon will also postpone the mental 
disengagement of workers from their work, thus increasing their commitment to invest in their job 
and their employability. 
If we look at the motives, the Michel Administration’s wish to replace the old Generation Pact with a 
more voluntary proposition may be a prime factor. The incremental impact of the Generation Pact was 
thought to be insufficient in increasing the employment rate of the 50+ segment. Still, the evidence 
that an increase in the pension age to 67 would have a significant impact on the employment rate of 
the 50-to-65 segment remains disputable. Some respondents therefore claim the motive behind this 
is to remove the subject of pensions from the social dialogue table, as the trade unions would 
presumably never agree to a proposal with a strong activation component for older workers. This 
hypothesis has been confirmed to some extent, as the fierce opposition of the trade unions in the 
autumn of 2014 forced the government to put the early retirement sections of the measure back on 
the social dialogue table, where indeed a number of significant exemptions were formulated. 
However, the pension age itself remained in the hands of the government, demonstrating the wish to 
make a clear statement to the general population: thou shalt work longer. A third motive is to be 
sought in pressure from the European Commission and benchmarking with neighbouring countries 
(European Commission, 2014; European Commission, 2015; European Commission, 2015a). As 
Belgium’s budget deficit risked exceeding the 3% norm, the government was well aware that it had to 
incorporate structural measures within its programme. Raising the pension age was one of them. 
The actors involved were the European Commission, the Belgian federal government and its coalition 
partners. The new player in the field was the N-VA party, socio-economically conservative and the 
winner of the 2014 elections. N-VA played an ideological role, if only by their wish to adapt the Belgian 
social welfare system. As it was designed, this (‘Bismarckian’) system consists of a combination of 
individual insurance and social solidarity. The N-VA, supported by, among others, the Flemish 
employers’ organization VOKA, was obviously determined to strengthen the insurance part of the 
system (based on individual responsibility) and to diminish the solidarity part. The other parties at the 
table plead for nuances, but in principle did not object. As a whole, the pension age measure was 
legitimised through reference to the Pension Reform Commission, even though the latter had 
presented a much more intricate plan which included a long process of social acceptance. 
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Format & implementation 
By 30 June 2015, the parliamentary commission had accepted the proposal to raise the pension age to 
66 (by 2025) and 67 (by 2030), together with stricter regulations for early retirement. This means that 
the proposal is to become a law in due time, save for an unexpected fall of the Michel Administration. 
Still in progress - and provisionally open-ended - are the negotiations by the social partners about the 
list of ‘heavy labour’ for which a shorter career would be accepted. One method suggested by the 
Pension Reform Commission is to use the points system (measuring the length of the career) in such a 
way that certain occupations would receive a coefficient ‘1.xx’ for a working year instead of a nominal 
‘1’. The Commission also suggests keeping the budget of ‘heavy labour’ under control by allotting the 
social partners a total (in terms of costs) for all occupations combined which cannot be exceeded 
(Commission for Pension Reform, 2015). 
Perceptions on effectiveness and impact 
Most stakeholders agree that the financial sustainability of the social welfare system - including the 
pension system - is very important. However, opinions differ regarding the extent to which this system 
is under threat, whether the system has to be self-sustaining or could be dependent on other funds, 
and whether raising the legal retirement age is a suitable strategy in raising the actual retirement age. 
Employers’ organisations and trade unions find themselves at opposing ends with regard to these 
issues. Unions have an issue with the European preoccupation with life expectancy (which should be 
‘healthy life expectancy’ in the first place). However, closer to the work floor employers and local 
unionists may share the same idea about the desirability of keeping older workers employed or 
available for the labour market, as it was traditionally a third party (the taxpayer) who paid the costs 
for early retirement. As the taxpayer gradually became aware of this mechanism, the pension age 
measure could count on at least some degree of acceptance. The distant horizon of the measure - 
taking going into effect until 2025/2030 - has also helped many to accept the idea of having to work 
longer. 
Innovative character 
Given the score of countries who preceded Belgium in raising the pension age, the measure in itself 
can hardly be characterised as innovative. However, the measure meant breaking with the tradition of 
leaving retirement issues entirely to the national, sector-specific or local social dialogue table. Also, 
the Pension Reform Commission induced the idea of an intricate points system to calculate the length 
of the career and thereby the pension one is entitled to. 
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Innovation II: Employment plan for older workers at company level. 
In a nutshell 
People are supposed to work longer, but are they able to work longer and should policy intervene to 
create the conditions for older workers to remain active? This question, juxtaposing workability with 
activation, was the basis for a number of measures; the company employment plan for older workers 
is the latest. It was processed by the social partners and took the form of a collective agreement. 
Background 
One of the classic arguments by trade unionists when the idea of longer careers was raised was that 
work should be feasible for workers in their 50s and 60s. Parallel to employability, the term workability 
was launched. One of the typical measures of the 1990s was the end-of-career time credit for 50+ 
employees; the option to work part time, 80% or 50%, and receive a compensation premium from the 
regional government. An OECD review stated: ‘Very few workers aged 60-64 take advantage of these 
arrangements, unlike those aged 50-54 or 55-59 (around 8% of the population concerned in 2011). In 
fact, by the time they reach 60-64, a large percentage of the target group has already left the labour 
market. At a Higher Labour Council meeting in 2012 the question was raised as to whether or not the 
system actually did keep people working longer or rather led to a reduction in the number of hours 
worked by the workforce as a whole.’ (OECD, 2012, p.8). The age limit for eligibility for this time credit 
was increased to 60 in 2014. 
Another measure, situated on the work floor itself was the Experience Fund which offers incentives to 
companies that take initiatives to accommodate their older workers (job content, physical workload, 
improving skills and competences, etc.). The way this Fund was to be used was the subject of a law 
(2004) in which the concept of workability was first introduced. The implementation however 
remained at a modest level (FOD WASO, 2010). 
The Di Rupo Administration, keen on complementing its reduction of early retirement policy by 
positive incentives to keep more employees in the 55-65 age bracket at work, asked the social partners 
of the National Employment Council (NAR) to develop a framework agreement for company level 
employment plans. This took the form of the National Collective Agreement 104 (June 2012). The 
Agreement suggested a non-limitative list of initiatives which employers could use in drawing up an 
annual ‘company employment plan for recruiting and/or retaining 45+ year-old employees’. Initiatives 
include: recruitment of new 45+ staff, training and developing competences, career guidance, internal 
mutations, adapting working hours and conditions to meet the needs of older employees, preventing 
and remedying physical barriers and recognising acquired competences (experience). A condition is 
that the employer must negotiate this plan with his workers’ representatives (union) or, in small or 
medium enterprises, inform the workers. Plans are to be made available for any social inspection. 
Companies with fewer than 20 employees are exempt from this obligation (ACLVB, 2013). 
Drivers 
The rationale, carried by the social democrats in the Di Rupo Administration was a quid-pro-quo idea: 
working longer will only be an option if the work is workable. By making it the subject of a collective 
agreement, the government hoped to generate ownership of this idea, which in turn would increase 
the chances of implementation. The Workability Monitor of the Flemish Advice Council SERV (SERV, 
2013) repeatedly shows the many risks to which older employees in particular are exposed: stress, 
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difficult working relationships, low-learning potential of tasks, etc. However, our interviews indicated 
a considerable degree of scepticism by employers as well as trade unions regarding the possibility of 
imposing any type of workability regulation through a top-down mechanism. Company plans only 
come into effect in times of tight labour markets (low unemployment) or when they are promoted and 
upheld by trade unions at local (company) level. Otherwise, they are felt as just another bureaucratic 
hassle and implemented purely as a formality. 
Format & implementation 
The measure took the form of a collective agreement (National CAO 104), signed in 2012 and still valid 
today. How many of these local company plans have been drawn up and to what extent they affect 
the well-being of employees over the age of 45 (having a positive effect on work continuation) is 
unknown. 
Perceptions on effectiveness and impact 
As said under ‘drivers’, both employers and trade unions remain sceptical as to the applicability and 
possible impact of this collective agreement. Employers consider the seniority-based wage model as 
the real reason for the reluctance of employers to recruit and keep older employees. Trade unions 
defend the principle of validating acquired competences but regret that the agreement lacks an 
effective inspection and sanction mechanism. A survey among companies (Lamberts et al., 2012) 
showed that in the recruitment process, the candidate’s age is much more a factor of discrimination 
than any other personal characteristic (gender, religion, migration background). Although the problem 
has been acknowledged, there seems to be no consensus on the type of policy to address this problem, 
other than general campaigns. As a rule, compulsory measures in the domain of workability are mostly 
ignored by employers and not promoted in a convincing manner by the trade unions. However, there 
are some exceptions: in the non-profit sector, the metal working sector and the chemical sector a 
number of company plans claim to have been developed and implemented (De Standaard, 2015a). 
Also, given the increased career length, politicians such as the current Minister of Economy and 
Employment Kris Peeters are again showing interest in the concept of workability (De Standaard, 
2015). 
Innovative character 
Although unsuccessful, the innovative character of the measure cannot be denied. A type of regulation 
enters the terrain which has historically been the exclusive domain of the employer: job content, job 
allocation and work organisation. Therefore, studying the cases in which company plans have been 
made and had some effect and analysing the factors making them successful seems advisable. This 
study, commissioned by the Christian Trade Union is currently underway. It demonstrates that unions 
are gradually shifting their attention from hard matters (wages and working hours) to the soft matters 
of industrial relationships. 
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Innovation III: Activation of older unemployed persons: adapted availability 
In a nutshell 
The approach to activating older unemployed persons requires that those persons are available for a 
job. In the past, the definitions of ‘availability’ and ‘suitable job’ have been the subject of much debate 
(Termote & Galand, 2009). Given the reluctance of employers to recruit older unemployed persons, 
the government developed the concept of ‘adapted availability’, somewhere between active and 
passive availability - putting it in a grey zone between law and practice. 
Background 
In order to put the idea of an active welfare state into practice, former Minister of Social Affairs and 
Pensions (federal, 1999-2003) and Minister of Work, Education and Training (Flanders, 2004-2009) 
Frank Vandenbroucke developed working definitions of the extent to which the unemployed 
‘jobseeker’ should be available for a job. Active availability means that one should seek work 
proactively, i.e. provide proof of a sufficient number of job applications. Passive availability means that 
one should apply for suitable jobs or respond to a request to apply for a specific vacancy. Active 
availability was first - in 2004 - introduced for the young (under 30) and later extended to the under 
40 and under 50 groups. 
As the regional authorities gained more competences for the broad domain of job placement and job 
mediation, the social partners in the Flemish region decided to extend the activation policy to the 50+ 
category (VESOC, 2008; SERV, 2012; Jobat.be, 2015). Well aware that the 50+ group would require a 
specific approach, a procedure was set up including a collective info session, an individual interview, 
an assessment of the individual competences and joint determination of what would be a suitable job 
for the person as well as developing a customised job-seeking plan. Refusal to cooperate could 
eventually lead to a transmission to the unemployment benefit payment agency. 
The Flemish Public Employment Service (VDAB) played a decisive role in processing this regulation. 
Making use of its data mining and calculating outflow chances per category of competences as well as 
jobs, VDAB is able to monitor and if necessary adjust the customised job-seeking plans. This approach 
was first used to activate the 50-55 age bracket, later extended to 58 and (in April 2014) to 60. In March 
2014, the Flemish government could proudly announce that the outflow results for the 50-55 age 
bracket had improved by 40%. Though they did have to admit that this success was not duplicated for 
the 55+ group. 
As it appeared by October 2014, the newly formed federal government of Prime Minister Michel also 
had plans for older unemployed persons, not just for ‘ordinary’ unemployed persons but those 
unemployed due to collective redundancies. The concept ‘adapted availability’ was proposed for the 
latter. The idea was that a person in this group was to apply for suitable jobs, in compliance with 
his/her customised plan. The plan, which is to be provided within 6 months after being made 
redundant, may also include training or outsourcing. Apart from the clear personalised approach, 
adapted availability does not seem to differ much from passive availability. 
Drivers 
One of the cornerstones of the federal government programme is increasing the employment rate. 
One of the strategies used to that end is to activate the older unemployed persons, mainly those in 
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the 50-65 age bracket. Research has shown that a personalised approach is the most effective tool in 
helping unemployed people find a job. Particularly - as OECD (2015), among others, were emphasising 
in their country recommendations for Belgium - when unemployment is still recent, intensive 
monitoring and guidance provide the highest chances of preventing persons slipping into long-term 
unemployment. Presenting this approach as passive availability was thought to send the wrong signal, 
thus the term adapted availability. 
This strategic reflection coincided with the claim made by the Flemish PES (VDAB) that, given the 
proper tool, they could activate anyone, regardless of skills, competences and age. This helped the 
government take the decision that everyone who became unemployed after December 2014 and was 
younger than 60, would receive the treatment described as ‘adapted availability’. 
It did not take long before criticism of this measure was heard. Some said the adapted availability of 
older workers (in particular those over 55) was nothing more than a superficial fix, since employers 
simply do not want to recruit older workers - because of their salary costs (Sels et al., 2013). The trade 
unions resent the government’s interference in a matter for which the social partners had reached a 
consensus: activate the newcomers in the unemployed 50-55 age bracket and leave the others alone 
(i.e. the long-term unemployed and the 55+ group). The irony is that the PES simply does not have the 
means to effectively follow up and sanction the ‘unwilling’ job seekers. 
When the social partners (‘group of 10’) agreed to exclude the victims of collective redundancies from 
the government’s activation arrangement, not only the stock but also the newcomers, the government 
responded by claiming the primacy of policy (Parliamentary Commission, 2015; De Standaard, 2015b). 
It was at that time that a face-saving way out was found by using the term ‘adapted availability’. 
Format & implementation 
The regulation known as ‘adapted availability’ of older unemployed persons is currently applied by the 
Public Employment Services, although a sanctioning mechanism is lacking. A legal framework is yet to 
be developed (2015) as the situation for collective redundancies victims is still unsettled. 
Perceptions on effectiveness and impact 
The ‘sceptics’ of activating 50+ unemployed persons may feel supported by research figures. The 
Labour Force survey of 2013 showed that only 3* of all unemployed persons in the 50+ group do find 
a job within the next month. ‘All unemployed’ also includes the long-term unemployed. By contrast, 
the activation ‘optimists’ will point at the figure of 28% of the recent unemployed 50+ group (and 
15.6% of the recent unemployed 55+ group) that find a job within three months. ‘Recent’ means: no 
longer than four weeks. So, activating people who only recently lost their job does have an effect for 
some, while activating the middle- term or long-term unemployed does not have any effect and will 
only cause frustration. 
Academics continue to emphasise the strengths and assets of older workers (Struyven, 2010; Van 
Gramberen, 2015).Even the most obstinate activation pundit will admit that the current employers’ 
unwillingness to recruit older candidates is a trend that needs to be reversed. Challenging as this 
prospect may be, the argument invariably associated with this reluctance is the high cost of seniority. 
Opening negotiations on this subject is, however, just as much a taboo for the trade unions. 
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Innovative character 
The measure is not innovative in the conceptual sense, as the concept ‘adapted availability’ is a cover 
for ‘passive availability’, thereby causing confusion and legal uncertainty. But the idea of basing a legal 
regulation (‘what should be done for the 50+ category’) on an on-going practice in a street-level 
institution (i.e. the Flemish PES, indicating ‘what can be done & what is being done for the 50+ 
category’) is quite an innovation in Belgian socio-economic policy making. The ever refining set of 
indicators on outflow (to a job) of unemployed persons gives the Flemish PES an authority which has 
led to replication in the Brussels and Wallonia PES. 
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Innovation IV: Youth Employment Plan 
In a nutshell 
As youth unemployment was quite high in Belgium even before the financial crisis, experiments were 
set up to develop methods to reach the hard-to-reach young unemployed in order to find a suitable 
route to work and integrate. The more successful outcomes were mainstreamed by the PES in a 
strategic effort (‘find them early’) endorsed by the EU Youth Guarantee Plan. The overall impact of the 
Youth Employment Plan, however, remains disputed. 
Background 
The EU 1998 Employment Guidelines launched the idea of the ‘comprehensive approach’ for 
unemployed persons in general and for unemployed youths in particular. Each and every job seeker 
was to get a new or fresh start from the PES within 12 months, and within 6 months for those under 
25. In 2005, Flemish Minister for Work, Education and Training Frank Vandenbroucke ordered a set of 
experiments which would become known as the ‘13 Cities Plan’ (Vandenbroucke, 2007). In 13 cities 
where youth unemployment proved particularly hard to eliminate, the PES was to cooperate with 
specialised NGOs in order to reach hard-to-reach youths. A combination of several methodologies, 
each adapted to the specific situation (local and group characteristics) was used, such as contacting, 
gaining trust, working on attitudes, e-monitoring. These pilots were subsequently to be extended and 
gradually mainstreamed within one overall plan, the Youth Employment Plan (VDAB, 2008). At the 
time, the employment rate for those under 25 was 32% in the Flemish region versus 37% in the EU. 
In a first evaluation, e-monitoring and the principle of tendering guidance and coaching to specialist 
NGOs were considered successful elements which deserved continuation (Van Parijs & Struyven, 2010; 
Van Parijs et al., 2010). Another study recommended systematising exchanges of approaches and good 
practices between employment agencies (Van Hemel & Darquenne, 2009). The EU Youth Guarantee 
pushed the PES to increase its efforts and reduce the period in which a person leaving school was to 
be contacted to 4 months. Special attention was to be devoted to the NEET group (Not in Employment, 
Education or Training) (European Commission, 2013b). 
In the Flemish Economic and Social Negotiation Committee (VESOC), a triple approach was added in 
2012: in-house individual vocational training, work experience projects for youths and step-in 
internships. 
Drivers 
For the EU, as well as the Belgian federal and regional governments, the young are a priority group, 
given their human capital value and the risk of having large concentrations of unemployed youths in 
urban areas. In comparison with older people, the young are much less a domain of ideological 
controversy or of conflicting views between employers and trade unions, as they have not yet built up 
any acquired rights. To set up experiments for certain groups was acceptable for all stakeholders 
concerned, as the risk that the hard-to-reach may soon be forever lost to the regular labour market 
introduction was essential. 
The Flemish PES (VDAB) took the opportunity to portray itself as a highly specialised and knowledge-
based organisation, learning from external partners, setting up experiments within the organisation 
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and keeping track of the results. VDAB has become a source of data and insights in its own right and a 
reliable tool for the Flemish policy makers (Leroy & Van Haeck, 2008). 
Thirdly, the NGOs that are the subject of the tenders saw the opportunity to demonstrate their added 
value in offering customised and context-sensitive approaches. 
Format & implementation 
The Youth Employment Plan was drawn up as a decree in 2009 and became part of the permanent 
contract between the Flemish government and the VDAB (PES). 
Perceptions of effectiveness and impact 
While generally speaking all parties seem to be in agreement about the Youth Employment Plan, critics 
from the left will accuse the PES of cherry-picking and window dressing, i.e. pretending to solve a 
problem that only seems to be growing in importance, namely the emergence of a young underclass 
that is not interested in education or work. On the employers’ side, critique is about the low efficiency 
of the experiments: one-to-one coaching, small groups and an outflow to a regular job of sometimes 
less than 10%. 
An internal evaluation of VDAB (VDAB, 2014) showed that the reach, i.e. the number of NEET youths 
was still too low in relation to the efforts it takes. The main bottleneck is that the youths in question 
often do not realise the importance of being counselled for a job and respond by not showing up and 
poor motivation. E-coaching, set up as a pilot for highly- skilled unemployed persons (online 
contacting, chat sessions, text messages) appeared to be the most successful component, certainly in 
view of the relatively low costs. The tenders with work experience pilots also showed good results. 
Innovative character 
Innovation was the reason for establishing the Youth Employment Plan. The idea to set up pilots and 
subsequently mainstream them into PES routine proved successful to some extent, but it was also 
costly and labour-intensive and not up to the huge challenge of a rising underclass of NEET youths. This 
challenge is more immanent for the Brussels and Walloon regions than for Flanders. 
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Innovation V: Integration allowance - Reform of the waiting allowance 
In a nutshell 
Waiting allowances are a specific form of unemployment allowances granted to young 
graduates/drop-outs in Belgium who have never worked and consequently have never contributed to 
the unemployment benefit system. While the Di Rupo Administration already created stricter eligibility 
conditions for this benefit, the Michel Administration further restricted them, much to the 
dissatisfaction of the trade unions. 
Background 
In Belgium, unemployed graduates/drop-outs can receive a waiting benefit after a certain ‘waiting 
period’ (unpaid period between leaving education and receiving the 1st allowance).The benefits are 
lump sums depending on their age and family situation and are only slightly above the level of social 
assistance benefits. 
In 2007, OECD produced an alarming report on Belgium’s youth unemployment. 20% of the (not in 
school) under 25 group was unemployed and 12% could be categorised as NEET (Not in Employment, 
Education or Training) (OECD, 2007). One of the bottlenecks was the abrupt school-to-work transition, 
notably the absence of the dual apprenticeship system and the low rate of youths combining school 
and work. Career paths were found to be strongly influenced by graduates’ first experience. One out 
of eight youths receiving an unemployment benefit one year after finishing school was still on 
unemployment after three years. It seemed that ‘settling into unemployment’ was a real risk for a 
certain group and that the waiting allowance was not being used for what it was intended. So, if the 
waiting allowance gave a signal of ‘perpetual unemployment benefit’, this perpetual element - it was 
thought - needed to be removed. 
This conviction was underlined by press articles mentioning the first waiting allowance beneficiary 
reaching retirement age. Other than that, of the 111,000 waiting allowance beneficiaries, 56% were in 
the 25-50 age category and 1% older than 50 (Trends, 2012). Belgium was said to be the only country 
- apart from Poland - where such waiting allowances were granted, i.e. where one could obtain 
unemployment benefits without ever having contributed to the social welfare system. 
The reform of the waiting allowance in 2012 (Di Rupo Administration) made the eligibility conditions 
for this benefit stricter in order to increase job search incentives and prevent abuse of the measure: 
(1) The ‘waiting period’ was extended from 6,9,12 months (depending on age) to 12 months for all new 
applicants. (2) The duration of the benefit (previously unlimited) was limited to three years, although 
there are some exceptions. (3) The benefits were restricted to those under 30 years of age. The waiting 
period was renamed professional integration period while ‘waiting allowances’ became ‘integration 
allowances’. 
However, criticism remained. While extreme abuse of the system was now reduced, the ‘integration 
allowance’ could still be a lever for a false career start. The suggestion was to introduce qualification 
requirements as conditions for benefitting from the integration allowance. 
The Michel Administration further restricted the benefit to those less than 25 years of age and added 
the requirement of a secondary school diploma. Strong lobbying by the trade unions resulted in a more 
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lenient educational requirement, thereby safeguarding 7,000 youths from exclusion (De Standaard, 
2014; RVA, 2015). 
Drivers 
The Flemish Minister for Finance, Budget, Work, Town and Country Planning and Sports Philip Muyters 
(N-VA) has always been explicit in his opinion on waiting allowances. He thought ‘being paid to wait’ 
was a negative offer and negative signal, and should be replaced by a positive offer (‘find-bind-mind’) 
to address youths. The ideology that ‘not working’ and settling into dependency should be discouraged 
as much as possible was a significant factor in the decision of the Michel Administration. Another 
consideration was that in principle, benefits were to be based upon contributions and exceptions 
should be restricted. 
The trade unions, while still defending the right to claim integration allowances, have given in to some 
extent, in exchange for not having ‘regular unemployment benefits’ limited in time, which was a 
demand of the employers and the right-wing parties. 
There are rumours - though unconfirmed - that regional priorities were a factor in the Michel 
Administration’s decision. Youth unemployment is higher in Wallonia (32%) and Brussels (39%) than 
in Flanders (16%), while Flemish political parties (less concerned by these figures than their French-
speaking counterparts) are more influential in the federal government. Another - equally unconfirmed 
- speculation explains the rather soft resistance by the trade unions through the characteristics of the 
target group most impacted by the measure: many non-Belgians cannot be unionised. 
Format & implementation 
The restrictive interpretation of the integration allowance eligibility criteria is a governmental decision 
that is already applied in practice. In 2014, it meant that 17,000 people lost their allowance, partly due 
to the age limit and partly due to the education requirement. However, the trade unions’ intervention 
regarding the interpretation of educational qualification ‘saved’ 7,000 youths. 
Perceptions of effectiveness and impact 
The measure does have an immediate budgetary impact on the national social welfare system. It can 
however create an extra burden for the local (communal) social security budgets. Whether it works as 
an incentive to put more young people to work remains to be seen. 
Some study programmes had already underlined the need to limit the integration allowance in time, 
if only to compensate with higher regular unemployment benefits during the first months (Eeckhout 
& Konings, 2014). The idea is to tie benefits and allowances exclusively to prior employment, and to 
alter its significance: to omit the fear of losing a job and to invest heavily in job searches during the 
first weeks or months of unemployment. However, the authors also advocate for better targeting of 
unemployed urban youths and reducing the minimum wage for the younger categories. 
The trade unions resent the measure. The French-speaking parts of Belgium would be particularly 
affected as they have more ‘repeaters’ (those who finished their studies later because of not passing 
exams) and people who combine their higher studies with student jobs. In general, this group of people 
has a professional career start so fragmented that they never reach the status of having worked one 
year continuously, a status which entitles them to regular unemployment benefits: disabled, children 
from broken families, drug addiction, etc. The disappearance of the integration allowance has made 
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this group unreachable. They cannot be detected and they no longer have a reason to be in contact 
with the PES. 
Innovative character 
This measure would be innovative if it had a positive counterpart in addition to the restrictive part: a 
methodology to reach, follow up and motivate this hard-to-reach target group. While the find-bind-
mind philosophy and the Youth Employment Plan (see innovation 4) are steps in that direction, it is 
felt that a significant part of this target group is now missing out on any integration efforts. 
1.2.5 Summary of the innovations 
The table below does not do justice to the uniqueness and the context of each of the selected 
innovations but it does provide an overview allowing the comparison of certain key parameters. 
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Table 1.2.5 - Overview of the innovations: drivers, actors, effect and characteristics 
Innovation Drivers: rationale & motives Proponents & opponents Effects & perceptions Characteristics 
I - Pension Age 
Reform (Federal, 
2014-15) 
Financial sustainability of pension 
system (life expectancy; career length) 
Employment rate of older workers 
Bypass social dialogue 
European benchmark 
European Commission 
Michel 1 Administration 
(centre-right) 
Employers federation 
Pension Reform Commission 
 
Trade unions (opponent) 
 
Budgetary impact 
 
Postponed disengagement of 
older workers 
Remaining reluctance of 
employers to recruit/keep older 
workers 
Unannounced measure 
Method of ‘least resistance’ 
Heavy protest leading to 
exemptions 
II - Company plans 
for older workers 
(Collective 
Agreement, 2012 
Workability (in addition to employability 
& activation) 
Quality of work on the social dialogue 
table 
Di Rupo Administration (& 
social democrats) 
National social partners 
 
Local social partners 
(disinterest) 
 
Slow implementation 
 
Symbolic value 
Perception of bureaucracy 
Innovation 
Envisioned as the first step in a 
process  
III - Adapted 
availability of older 
unemployed 
(Federal, 2015) 
Activation 
Redefining ‘suitable job’ and 
‘availability’ 
Michel 1 Administration 
PES (VDAB) 
 
Social partners (opponent) 
Implementation depending on 
PES capacity 
 
Symbolic value 
 
Superficial & semantic 
IV - Youth 
Employment Plan 
(Flemish, 2008) 
Integration of marginalised youths into 
education & labour system 
Youth unemployment 
Flemish government 
PES (VDAB) 
Civil society (specialized NGOs) 
 
Significant & incremental, but 
costly 
Innovation 
Progressively improving insight 
Uncontested 
V - Reform of 
waiting allowance 
(Federal, 2012, 
2014) 
Activation 
Budget austerity 
Emphasise ‘no benefits without 
contribution’ mechanism 
European benchmark 
Federal governments (Di Rupo 
/ Michel) 
PES (VDAB) 
 
Trade unions (opponent) 
 
Budgetary impact 
 
Risk of growing underclass 
Prevention of long-term 
unemployment (by early 
intervention) 
 
Ideological discussion on 
welfare (intrinsic right or linked 
to contribution) 
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1.3. Assessment of the influence exercised from key factors in the 
performance of each innovation 
Throughout the cases presented in section 2, we found a number of key factors in the performance of 
the measures in terms of labour market (not budgetary) policy. These factors may be facilitating, 
inhibiting or neutral for the measure to be successful, and this may depend on the context or the bigger 
picture. We will refer to the cases as listed in table 2.5 with their Latin number (I to V). 
- Continuing or breaking a tradition 
Some measures (such as III, adapted availability and V, waiting allowance reform) are a continuation 
and a gradual extension of the activation policy implemented in the late 1990s. They touch upon 
categories which thus far had escaped activation (graduates/drop-outs, older unemployed persons) 
but who would now be included in the routine PES machinery. However, the effectiveness of activating 
the 55+ and 60+ remains to be seen. 
Measures I (pension age) and II (company plans) were to some extent breaking a taboo and may in the 
long run be successful. Measure I (pension age) was breaking a barrier and the consensus attached to 
it by shifting the focus from the career length to the physical age. Measure II (company plans) had 
stepped into unknown territory: adapting and steering work organisation within a company from the 
exterior. 
- Change of government 
The 1999 election victory for both the Flemish and French-speaking liberal parties led to the so-called 
purple coalition between liberals and democrats. A compromise between the entrepreneurial and the 
compassionate society materialised in the idea of an Active Welfare State. Measures such as 
integrating marginalised groups into the labour market and improving school-to-work transition 
became popular. However, it became increasingly clear that different regions meant different political 
realities, which led to measures being the result of compromises and therefore not always openly 
breaking with the past. The French-speaking socialists remained in power until 2014, preventing the 
crumbling of acquired rights. This changed dramatically after the 2014 landslide victory of the Flemish 
regionalist and conservative N-VA party, which had a double effect: the Flemish extreme right was 
pushed off the scene and a parliamentary majority without a socialist presence became a possibility. 
The new coalition under Charles Michel found a sudden freedom to implement a number of fiscal, 
economic and social policy measures which until then had been deemed impossible. In this sense, 
change of government may work as a factor of innovation. However, our examples show that a 
paradigm change (first-order learning) does not necessarily correspond with a change of government. 
- Broad stakeholder support 
Complete stakeholder support would mean either active support from or at least tolerance by a range 
of actors: the political class (coalition partners, opposition parties); the social partners (employers 
federations and trade unions) at national, sector-specific and local level; significant institutions, 
interest groups and opinion makers; economic actors; and the general population. When budgetary 
discipline is at stake, the European Commission is also an important actor. Complete support is not 
necessary for a policy or a measure to be successful but broad support certainly helps, as is 
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demonstrated by measure IV (Youth Employment Plan). Measure I (pension age) is an example of 
generating sufficient support to push it through and ignore the protests of opponents. It cut short the 
negotiation process which was due to take place in the social dialogue forum. None of the coalition 
partners had mentioned this shift in their election programmes. This measure came in stark contrast 
with its predecessor The Generation Pact, which never got out of the ‘war zone’ (disputes, 
amendments and exemptions) since its introduction in 2005. 
- The presence of an implementing agency 
Measure II (company plans) makes sense content-wise and comes across as well thought-out. Yet it 
lacks a champion on the ground, as the many scattered and dispersed employers and local union 
delegates have more urgent priorities than improving the workability of older employees’ jobs. The 
measures III (adapted availability), IV (Youth Employment Plan) and V (waiting allowance) have, on the 
other hand, a yes-we-can partner: the PES, keen on demonstrating it can activate anyone anywhere 
anytime. This gives measures which are still heavily disputed (in the case of III (adapted availability) 
and V (waiting allowance) a possibility of being implemented. 
- Policy density 
Some measures appear like seeds sown in a dense forest. This forest of pre-existing measures and 
policies may work favourably for the measure if the seed was sown on fertile and available soil, but it 
will suffocate if the environment is a wilderness of old arrangements, the logic and coherence of which 
is understood by only a few. Early retirement is an example of such a wilderness. Measures in the area 
of early retirement stem from a plethora of policy traditions, each with its own equilibriums and 
stakeholders. These include the domains of labour redistribution (as a tool against unemployment), 
medical prevention, social protection, company reorganisations and closures, social conflicts, gender 
equality, etc. Measure III (adapted availability) falls within a different logic: activation, employment 
rate, availability. The multitude of policy domains affected (including labour market policy, social 
welfare, health care…) may mean just as many hurdles to overcome, in the shape of resistance, abuse 
and simple non-implementation (‘dead letter’). Compared to this, measure I (pension age) is like 
cutting through air, less charged by past and acquired positions and much more likely to be 
implemented without much fuss. 
- Symbolic value 
Measure I (pension age) contains considerable symbolic value as the pension age is an important figure 
in everyone’s life. Announcing a measure such as this prior to the decision would lead to 
insurmountable debates and obstacles. However, once the decision is taken, the symbol may be 
quickly forgotten; people anticipate a scenario of working longer and resistance fades. This is certainly 
helped by the relatively far horizon of the measure to be implemented. Measure II (company plans) 
has a symbolic value as well - breaking into the employer’s sole leadership role - but the absence of 
realistic implementation means it does not cause much of a stir. 
- External authority 
The ‘power of the international argument’ plays a role in Belgium, where the ‘national ideology’ (above 
the political divides) is one of ‘open economy’ and ‘pro-Europe’, thus, OECD reports, IMF diagnosis and 
European Commission Country Recommendations are taken seriously. Benchmarking has been a 
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driving factor in the pension age issue (measure I), the early retirement issue (measure III) and the 
activation issue in general (measure V). Internal authority, separate from and ‘above’ the daily 
decision-making theatres (government, parliament, social dialogue) has been successfully generated 
in the case of the Pension Reform Commission which paved the way -willingly or not- for measure I 
(pension age). 
- Proof of effectiveness 
Pilots (in the case of measure IV, Youth Employment Plan) and careful calculation (in the case of 
measures I, pension age and V, waiting allowance reform) have been supportive in accepting the 
decisions taken. In contrast, the conceptual obscurity and lack of data on measure III (adapted 
availability) have heavily impeded the practicability of the measure. 
- Transparency and complexity 
These factors come close to the policy density factor but first and foremost they concern the measure 
in its own right. The acceptance of measures I (pension age: ‘work longer’) and V (waiting allowance 
reform: ‘no allowance without former contribution’) benefit from the clarity of their message and the 
closeness to the ideological principles of which they are a practical translation. 
- Accredited value pundits 
In the past, Frank Vandenbroucke (former Federal Minister of Social Affairs and Flemish Minister of 
Work and Education) has championed the idea of the Active Welfare State with rational and scientific 
arguments, making the ideology it supports credible and acceptable: work as the origin of value and 
rights, solidarity to those who cannot work due to reasons beyond their control and the financial 
sustainability of the social welfare system. Vandenbroucke’s image is one of a socialist gone realist, 
with a full understanding of economic drivers and incentives. Having established an aura of integrity 
and profound expertise (high profile academic), Vandenbroucke has always been open in explaining 
the advantages of this system as well as the efforts it requires. This paradigm has marked the Youth 
Employment Plan as well as the Pension Reform Commission. In a dialectic twist of events, many of 
these principles are now being used by the present conservative (centre-right) government for the 
sake of budgetary austerity which complements its policy of economic competitiveness. Balancing 
between austerity and solidarity, the current Minister of Economy and Employment Kris Peeters could 
be seen as the pundit of the present labour market policy. Peeters’s profile is one of an entrepreneur 
gone compassionate. The intelligent combination of apparently conflicting value systems tends to 
increase a politician’s credibility to a point that he/she could become an innovative factor in his/her 
own right. 
- Devolution 
Transferring competences to the regions creates opportunities (clean slate) as well as risks (lack of 
experience). The Flemish PES has grabbed the chance to become a performant organisation where 
innovation and experiments are encouraged. However, this is the fruit of a process which took quite 
some time. The PES sense of innovation and its investment in data mining together with the small scale 
on which this service is operating has contributed to their handling of special categories of unemployed 
(cfr. measure IV, Youth Employment Plan, measure V, reform of waiting allowance and presumably 
measure III, adapted availability). The PES of Wallonia is now in the process of copying the good 
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practices of their Flemish colleagues, even though the Walloon labour market faces in part different 
challenges. On the risk side, devolution may also create conflicts of interest which could take the shape 
of legal procedures and judgements by the constitutional court. However, wary of a negative and 
paralysed image, the political class seems to avoid stepping into this trap. 
- Social dialogue 
The social partners are embedded in a tradition of exclusive dialogue on domains directly affecting 
wages, working time and career structure. Their knowledge of ‘what happens on the floor’ is 
considered indispensable if a measure is to be realistic and implementable. This explains the difficulty 
the government has in imposing measure III (adapted availability) through by-passing the National 
Labour Council (national level of social dialogue). However, they could also be considered to have 
‘tunnel vision’ when it comes to opening new paradigms or confronting old taboos. This leads many to 
conclude that the Pension Age Reform (measure I) would never have been realised had it been put on 
the social dialogue table. 
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1.4. Conclusion: effectiveness and impact of the innovations 
As for the effectiveness of the selected policy measures, our analysis allows for linking the key factors 
for the performance of the innovation with the intended level of change through the measure 
(operational, strategic or paradigmatic). What our cases demonstrate is that strategic changes require 
factors other than operational changes, and paradigmatic changes require yet other factors. 
For paradigmatic changes, the measure would require that the symbolic value it embodies is 
championed by an agent at implementation level (e.g. ‘company plans for older workers’ should be 
carried out by the social partners at company level or by another decentralised agency). Failing this, 
the measure will be no more than a ‘dead letter’, lacking the power to be pushed through. For strategic 
changes (e.g. pension age), our cases demonstrate that value pundits, external authorities and 
discontinuities in government are decisive factors and that transparency (easy to understand) works 
as a facilitator. Operational changes are served more by factors such as governmental continuity, 
willing and able implementing agencies and familiarity with the issue at the level where the measure 
is engineered (social partners, PES, administration). 
Whether the selected innovations have the desired impact in terms of resilience and inclusiveness with 
regard to the target groups they focus on is at this stage difficult to determine. If inclusiveness means 
‘at work or likely to be at work in due time’, measures envisioning the young may generate more 
impact than measures envisioning older people. The selected measures could be characterised as 
‘push’ or ‘pull’ measures. Push measures tend to decrease alternative earnings of living (retirement 
pensions, welfare grants, unemployment benefits) and would therefore only work as an incentive. 
Conversely, pull measures keep people in employment (company plans for older workers) or enhance 
people’s capacities (Youth Employment Plans). Most of the measures selected are recent (2012 to 
2015) and have not yet been evaluated. Any conclusion in terms of increased resilience would 
therefore be premature. 
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2. Processes of policy learning in Belgium(WP5) 
2.1. Introduction 
Continuing on the data gathering for the Work Packages 2, 3 and 4 of the INSPIRES project in Belgium, 
this paper focuses on policy learning practices illustrated by three Belgian cases of labour market policy 
innovations. These three, further elaborated in section 3, are: the Pension Age Reform (I), the adapted 
availability of older unemployed (III) and the Youth Employment Plan (IV). The other two ‘innovations’ 
of WP4 (company plans for older workers (II) and reform of the waiting allowance for young 
unemployed (V)) were dropped as cases for policy learning, although some lessons from these cases 
may prove useful. In section 2, we explain the policy learning infrastructure in Belgium in a nutshell. 
Peter Hall (1993, p.278) defined policy learning as a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals and 
techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information. Hall connects learning with 
innovative changes and distinguishes thereby first-order, second-order and third-order changes. 
Second-order changes refer to the instruments used to achieve a goal (e.g. incentives for employers 
to recruit new personnel from a certain category), while first-order changes refer to the settings used 
for these instruments (e.g. the amount of the incentive, the definition of the target group or the 
conditions, such as the type of employment). These second- and first-order changes allow for what 
Van der Steen & Groenewegen (2008) refer to as ‘normal’ learning, taking place ‘within a well-defined 
institutional framework with harmonious relationships between the hierarchy of the institutional 
layers and based on clear and stable shared mental maps of the actors involved. The learning process 
is one of incremental change towards perfection’ (Van der Steen & Groenewegen, 2008, p.17). 
Third-order changes allow for learning by reconsidering theories-in-use or paradigms. This type of 
learning would be more likely to occur when there is a degree of instability in structures and where 
tensions exist between competing objectives or rules of the game. In his influential article, Hall 
elaborates on this through the example of the changes in British macroeconomic policy (from 
Keynesian to monetarist) in the period 1970-89 (Hall, 1993, p.283). 
Other authors such as Kemp & Weehuizen (2005) relate policy learning with cognitive theory and 
models of organisational learning. So-called learning organisations encapsulate the experiences of past 
employees and avoid hierarchical manipulation of information flows. The authors make a distinction 
according to the modus of learning (Kemp & Weehuizen, 2005, p.11): experience (learning by doing), 
observation of what others do, systematic study and interaction. 
Refining these for our study, we could specify the sources of evidence. Some are found within the 
political system and others are external. Some have a scientific character in the sense that they are 
based on data that are reproducible (and quantitative) and others are experience based (qualitative). 
Matrix wise, this could be presented as follows: 
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Table 2.1. – Sources of evidence in the proces of policy learning in Belgium 
 Systematic (repeatable and controlable)  
 
Non-systematic 
Internal 
source 
 
 Data monitoring and data mining by 
administrations and implementing 
agencies (like PES) 
 Pilots & experiments (e.g. non-
respons pilots - Youth Employment 
Plan) 
 National Bank & Plan Bureau 
 Learning by doing: experiences 
from successful and/or failed policy 
 
External 
source 
(independent) 
 Advice of expert commission (e.g. 
Pension Reform Commission) 
 Authority knowledge producer (KBS) 
 External data (Eurostat) 
 Academic research 
 Tendered evaluations 
 Country Recommendations (EC) 
 Peer reports (OECD, IMF) 
 Terrain knowledge (social partners) 
 Study centers 
 Individual think tanks (e.g. Itinera) 
 Media, human interest stories, 
social media 
 
Evidence can be used for different purposes and at different moments during the decision-taking 
process: 
 pro-actively for keeping updated; 
 for detecting, situating and explaining problems; 
 for simulating solutions (scenarios, roadmaps, inventory of good practices); 
 for legitimising decisions already taken. 
Policy learning should not be confused with political learning. Whereas policy learning refers to the 
content of a policy measure, political learning refers to the process and the tactics of pushing a 
measure through. However, political learning could be considered as just one of the aspects of policy 
learning.  
When does policy learning take place? Evidence could be seen as just one of many drivers of policy. 
The cases may give us a clue to the circumstances in which the use of evidence is triggered. 
As a driver of policy, evidence competes with a range of other drivers: power, ideology, lobbying, 
compromises and consensus between stakeholders, participation (incl. target groups), tradition, 
emergencies, generalisation of local experiments and tests. However, reality is much more complex 
than any categorisation can suggest. Mainstreaming tests or copying policy from abroad may be part 
of a strategy and therefore policy learning, but it may also be an opportunistic way of hiding the lack 
of any reflected strategy. 
Hall (1993, p.288) indicates that in times of political discontinuities, policy learning may take the shape 
of paradigm shifts and politicians rather than experts will play a dominant role. Keeping in mind our 
open conclusions from WP 4, we can narrow down one of our research questions to verifying whether 
or not policy learning could be influenced by the degree of controversy of the issue in combination 
with the degree of continuity of government. 
Hypothetically, this could mean that policy learning is likely to take place in two different scenarios: 
(1°) a highly controversial issue would need a change in government for policy learning (and hence 
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innovation) to take place, (2°) a less controversial issue would need continuity in government for policy 
learning (and hence innovation) to take place. In scenario 1, politicians would be the authors of 
learning, while in scenario 2 specialists or bureaucrats would be the authors. The parameters of this 
equation will, however, need more explicit measuring for the hypothesis to be corroborated. What 
exactly makes an issue more or less controversial? This may be measured through a combination of 
societal support, strength of public opinion and the seriousness of consequences for certain groups. 
What is meant by ‘change in government’ is also open for interpretation. Hall speaks of political 
discontinuities, meaning not just a new government but ‘a new sheriff in town’: a well-intended 
ideological shift by a new coalition or a new generation of politicians assuming power. 
In a table, this could be shown as follows: 
Table 2.2 – Hypothesis of parameters influencing policy learning 
Scena-
rio 
Contro
-versy 
issue 
Government 
(ideological 
composition) 
Likely authors 
of the 
innovation 
Examples (as referred to 
in WP 4) 
Type of change 
(according to WP 
4) 
1° High Change Politicians Pension age reform (I) Strategic 
X High Continuation Politicians Adapted availability (III) Operational 
X Low Change Specialists & 
bureaucrats 
Reform waiting allowance 
(V) 
Operational 
2° Low Continuation Specialists & 
bureaucrats 
Youth Employment Plan 
(IV)  
Company plans for older 
workers (II) 
Strategic 
 
Paradigmatic 
This matrix may look quite schematic and speculative. It presumes that shock innovations do need a 
change in government (scenario 1), while less spectacular though well-reflected innovations are better 
served by continuity (scenario 2). The latter scenario also contains possibilities for paradigmatic 
changes, but the example (company plans for older workers) is one of a change yet to be implemented. 
It also leaves the door open for scenario ‘X’, most likely less ingenious and more operational 
innovations which may have far-reaching consequences all the same. 
We will come back to this hypothesis when presenting the three selected cases of policy learning. 
Empirical evidence could indicate that there are still other parameters in addition to these which are 
essential for policy learning to take place. 
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2.2. The policy learning infrastructure 
Policy learning, as pointed out above, can result from policy failure, the pursuit of electoral goals, 
experimentation, benchmarking, studies and research. Another way of looking at it is from the point 
of view of knowledge (‘evidence’) producers, the supply side. This supply side is to some extent fluid, 
meaning it is difficult to isolate from circulating data, information and opinion shaping as it occurs in 
the world of the media and of politics. But the supply side is also to some extent institutionalised and 
locatable. 
Taking a closer look at these institutions in Belgium, the following is clear: 
- A number of institutions have a national status, are supposedly above party politics and are 
either an independent entrusted institution or embedded in the federal government. The 
Federal Plan Bureau is one of these institutions, carrying out studies and prospects on 
economic, social and ecological policy matters (including the labour market). Their reports are 
mainly based on undisputed ‘official’ data and are considered an important reference for 
policymakers. The National Bank of Belgium is the Belgian central bank, mandated to carry 
out Belgian monetary policy, regularly publishing reports and press releases on economic 
issues with a budgetary and monetary impact. The General Directorate on Statistics is part of 
the Economy Department and mandated with the gathering and distribution of reliable and 
representative data on all aspects of Belgian society (population census, household spending, 
health, consumption, etc.). The Economy Department also houses the Intersectional Database 
of Enterprises and the Intersectional Database of Social Welfare, consisting of firms and legal 
persons for the former as well as employees or social welfare beneficiaries (natural persons) 
for the latter. These databases gather and store data which can be used or made public on 
demand (bearing in mind privacy legislation and other procedures). 
- Labour market policy is to a large extent regional competence. The regions have set up their 
own study centres, either within their administration or as separate units. The Work and Social 
Economy (WSE) administration in the Flemish region regularly produces key figures of the 
Flemish labour market. For studies of importance for industrial relationships, advice organisms 
such as the SERV (Sociaal-Economische Raad van Vlaanderen) and STV (Stichting Technologie 
Vlaanderen) are called in. These studies are often made public in a forum called VESOC 
(Flemish Economic Social Dialogue Committee), the meeting point of the tripartite partners at 
Flemish level. Similar institutions also exist at the Brussels and Walloon level. 
- A number of academics are frequently called in as references, such as the CSB (Center for 
Social Policy, Antwerp University), Steunpunt WSE (Focal study point for Work and Social 
Economy, Leuven University), Institute for Social Law and HIVA (Leuven University), Koen 
Schoors (Ghent University) and many others. Academics also form the core of the pool of 
specialists who are commissioned for the elaboration of pending issues by the King Baudouin 
Foundation, an institute which cultivates an aura of neutrality and authority. 
- Many study centres are linked to political parties, trade unions and employer federations. 
Some independent think tanks (e.g. Itinera or Polyargus) are institutionally independent but 
ideologically close to certain political ideas and convictions. Some private companies (e.g. 
Randstad) regularly produce reports based on original data. 
- Temporary commissions at times play an important role when given the necessary credit, such 
as the Pension Reform Commission. The composition of this commission is subject to careful 
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selection and balancing. The High Council for Employment is a regular (annual) meeting of 
experts from the various political families, discussing their opinions and advice on data, 
policies and pending issues. 
The regionalisation (5th phase of the state reform) has played an important role in broadening the 
policy learning infrastructure. The Flemish administration adopted a tradition of tests and pilots during 
the 1990s by administering the projects of the European Structure Funds (ESF and EFRO). Flanders has 
also stimulated efforts to make scientific research more policy-oriented by tendering research 
programmes focused on a theme rather than on one specific research question. These tenders are 
known as VIONA (Flemish Inter-University Research Network Labour Market Reporting). This tradition 
of launching experiments as predecessors to more generic policy and bringing scientific research closer 
to policy logic has been fruitful, e.g. in setting up pilots for hard-to-reach youths (see section 3 below). 
The same factors have also played an important role in inducing an M&E (monitoring and evaluation) 
tradition accompanying significant policy measures and legislation. 
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2.3. Role of policy learning in the adoption of selected innovations 
Case 1: Reform of the pension age regime (innovation I) 
Measure 
After years of debate and attempts to raise the actual retirement age so it corresponded with the legal 
retirement age, the new Belgian federal government (‘Michel 1’) decided to raise the legal retirement 
age to 66/67 (by 2025/2030). This came as a surprise, as it was not announced in the electoral 
programmes of the coalition partners. 
Policy learning with regard to the issue 
The measure is a prime example of policy learning and could be qualified as a result of second-order 
learning (in Hall’s taxonomy), invoking changes at strategic level. The sources of policy learning in this 
case are three-fold: failed policy, external authority and delegated expertise. 
The retirement issue had been the subject of failed policy since its introduction. It started with the so-
called ‘Silver Fund’, created in 2001 by the then Minister of Budget Johan Vandelanotte. This Silver 
Fund - partly due to its association with this politician - was never popular with other governments and 
politicians. It was not fed with funds properly but with due bills, payable by some future government 
when the need arose. After some time, it was considered to be an empty box and an ineffective policy 
for the ageing challenge (Trends, 2011). The Generation Pact (2005, and again 2012) was achieved 
after a painfully long process of negotiations between the tripartite partners, after which the 
government finally usurped the matter. The result was a hazy compromise directed towards the 
restriction of early retirement schemes. This result was quickly watered down by all sorts of 
exemptions and - for lack of a real champion - never convincingly communicated to the public. The 
impact was minimal. The average retirement age increased extremely slowly and is still more than five 
years away from the legal retirement age. 
As an external authority, the European Commission (through European Semester) sent warnings to 
Belgium, demanding structural measures to increase the employment rate of the 50+ workers and to 
rationalise its budget to enable future financing for the social welfare department, including the 
pensions. As Belgium’s budget deficit broke through the 3% barrier in 2014, the Commission actually 
had grounds on which it could enforce Belgium to make structural reforms. Raising the pension age to 
67 was considered one of the two reforms that satisfied Europe. 
Meanwhile, the research work of the Pension Reform Commission had resulted in the compilation of 
a detailed implementation plan for early retirement and pension reform, containing a number of 
innovative elements such as a points system to indicate the career length (entitling age and rate of the 
pension). The existence of such a plan made it clear that a reform was not only desirable but also 
feasible. The neutral characterisation of the Pension Reform Commission (and the presence of 
‘socialist’ Frank Vandenbroucke) made the plan acceptable to the public and to a wide range of 
stakeholders - even if not admitted openly. It was never to become a popular measure and some self-
proclaimed opponents were happy that they were not the ones responsible for it. In terms of ‘content’, 
it would be fair to say that this research work was the most important contributor to the measure. 
36 
 
It would not be correct to attribute the measure only to policy learning, as ideology played an equally 
prominent role. The employers’ organisations, finding a partner in the political party N-VA (the 
conservative New Flemish Alliance) and in the neo-liberal media voices, had always emphasised the 
need for budgetary discipline in order to decrease the tax burdens and stimulate entrepreneurship. 
The budgets they had in mind would be financed by the public sector (i.e. the number of public service 
employees) and the check for social welfare, including pensioners. 
Policy learning with regard to the process 
The case is also an example of learning how to decide on a measure and push it through. The decision 
makers showed that they had learned from the past with regard to the timing of the decision, the 
consecutive steps in consultation and the form of the message. 
The decision was a sudden one, unannounced though not unexpected. It was a chapter in a 
government formation programme. This government, consisting entirely of political parties belonging 
to the centre-right, faced the formidable task of keeping the budget deficit under control while at the 
same time keeping its electoral promises to decrease tax pressure on businesses and citizens. Cutting 
expenses, be it in the public sector or the social welfare system, seemed the logical measure to take. 
The case is an example of political learning as much as policy learning. If the decision had been part of 
a participative process, a consultation round or a matter for social dialogue, it would never have been 
taken. A participative process does not work in complex issues. Social dialogue, as the Generation Pact 
demonstrated, is not productive in unpopular measures. Proposals are confronted with taboos and 
no-go areas, decisions are endlessly postponed and at the end of the day a third payer (i.e. the 
government and hereby the tax payer) is called in to smooth out the costs. In that sense, taking this 
type of decision in the small committee of the government formation negotiations was - from the point 
of view of the politicians involved - a smart move. 
In sharp contrast with the Generation Pact, the message held clarity for the public. Acceptability 
towards the public was facilitated by the time horizon. People over 55 would still be able to retire at 
65. Others had time to get used to the idea of having to work longer and adjust their lifestyle in the 
meantime. 
That said, some aspects in the decision making process were overseen and therefore less of an example 
of policy learning. The severe review of early retirement schemes collided with a body of ‘acquired 
rights’ which the unions were not going to give up without a fight. The street protests during autumn 
2014 focused on the collective redundancy pensioners being cast back into the labour system, whereas 
it was thought that they were out of the market. To restore social peace, the government had to give 
in to this group and thus put the social partners back in business. The prospect was that for this 
particular group, and for the so-called heavy labour, a system of exemptions would be worked out 
which may or may not affect the impact of the measure. 
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Case 2: Adapted availability of older unemployed persons (innovation III) 
Measure 
Activating older unemployed persons requires an approach that ensures that the person is available 
for a job. In the past, the definitions of ‘availability’ and ‘suitable job’ have been the subject of much 
debate. Given the reluctance of employers to recruit older unemployed persons, the Michel 
Administration developed the concept of ‘adapted availability’, situated somewhere between active 
and passive availability, making it difficult for street-level administrators to implement it. 
Policy learning with regard to the issue 
Policy learning has been a factor in the sense that existing insights and experience has been used. 
However, as explained below, the case could also be seen as a negative example of policy learning for 
its refusal to unveil obvious taboos and blind spots. 
Positively, the idea of availability continues with an ever-expanding body of knowledge on the active 
welfare state. The idea that the right to receive benefits should be based on past employment and/or 
readiness to be employed is further refined and extended in all sections of the economic system. 
Concepts such as activation and suitable job are translated into the present context, thinking in terms 
of careers and competences rather than jobs and diplomas. It was shown that older unemployed 
persons prepared to apply for jobs which corresponded to their experience rather than their exact 
qualifications were more likely to find a job. Experience is drawn from the Flemish region, where the 
PES developed specialised tools for guidance and counselling for risk groups, such as older workers. 
The PES has also been refining its own categorisations by making good use of data mining (applying a 
type of Big Data for matching job seekers to vacancies). The PES was driven in all of this by a 
management that previously had close ties with the Flemish Vandenbroucke cabinet (2005-2009). As 
explained above, Vandenbroucke, the then Flemish Minister of Work can be considered the ‘active 
welfare state pundit’ in Belgium. Another ‘gained insight’ - developed throughout discussions by the 
social partners - was to stimulate people to apply for jobs by having them keep their acquired rights 
(benefits and allowances) during a certain period in case a job was only temporary. 
At the critical side of the arrangement, tools, methods and incentives will have no effect if employers 
simply refuse to employ jobseekers older than a certain age, who see the recruited person as set in his 
ways, lacking dynamics and reluctant to learn. The decision makers apparently turned a blind eye to 
this taboo. A factor in this was the (hard to verify) claim by the Flemish PES that they could activate 
anyone, regardless of age, colour, etc. This claim sounds self-referential rather than evidence based, 
as just 3% of jobseekers who find a job within the first month are older than 50 - with nearly all of 
those belonging to the 50 to 55 group. Therefore, what remains is an issue unsettled and a measure 
unimplemented: adapted availability which was meant to be a renamed form of active availability is 
in practice nothing more than passive availability. 
Policy learning with regard to the process 
In terms of process, there was little evidence of policy learning when the decision was taken. A 
compromise between imposing either active or passive availability was not reached as the trade unions 
were particularly defensive when it came to the prospect of older persons becoming unemployed due 
to collective redundancies being reactivated. Adapted availability was thus a face-saving label which 
was not based on the analysis of conditions and consequences should the measure be implemented. 
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The measure remained a superficial one. Critics say this is an example of what happens if the 
government interferes in negotiation-based and compromise-seeking social dialogue where in-depth 
knowledge of the terrain is required. However, the government wanted to avoid a compromise which 
would be financed by the taxpayer. Moreover, it could not tolerate that when the pension age moved 
up to 67, an exemption would be made for this particular category which included people as ‘young’ 
as 52. The inventive solution of calling it adapted availability may look like political learning rather than 
policy learning. Given the activation debate of early retirees is by no means settled in a satisfactory 
way, the government decision tends to complicate the matter rather than solve it. It seems that when 
first-order (technical) policy learning is part of a process, it is not served by a deus ex machine. 
On a more positive note, the stalemate - much to the aggravation of some - with regard to the meagre 
outflow of older unemployed persons may open the path for further reflection and debating the high 
cost of seniority as well as the adverse effects this has on the employability of this category. So, policy 
learning could be an unwanted side-effect of an ineffective measure. 
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Case 3: Youth Employment Plan (innovation IV) 
Measure 
As youth unemployment was quite high in Belgium even before the financial crisis, experiments were 
set up to develop methods to reach the hard-to-reach young unemployed in order to find a suitable 
route to work and integrate. The more successful outcomes were mainstreamed by the PES in a 
strategic effort (‘find them early’) endorsed by the EU Youth Guarantee Plan. The overall impact of the 
Youth Employment Plan, however, remains disputed. 
Policy learning with regard to the issue 
If the Youth Employment Plan was to some extent successful, this is due to policy learning. Policy 
learning was thereby stimulated by a series of factors. The EU 1998 Employment Guideline proposed 
a comprehensive approach for the unemployed in general and unemployed youths in particular, 
meaning in the case of the young that each and every jobseeker was to get a fresh start by the PES 
within 6 months. At the same time, the early results of ESF funded projects caught the interest of 
Flemish policymakers, bringing in evidence of the importance of a pathway guidance of unqualified 
drop-outs. By 2004, this resulted in the proclaimed intention to elaborate on the Find-Bind-Mind 
methodology, implying the need of a local presence, good cooperation with schools and connecting 
with the mental reality of these young unemployed persons. In order to implement these intentions, 
the then Flemish Minister of Work Frank Vandenbroucke ordered a set of experimental pilots which 
would became known as the ‘13 Cities Plan’ (2005). One of the core elements was that the outreach 
to the hard-to-reach was to be tendered to specialised NGOs. By 2008, the lessons of these pilots were 
mainstreamed into generic routinised practice of the Flemish PES under the flag of Youth Employment 
Plan. Depending on the geographical location and the characteristics of the specific target group, 
various forms of step-by-step approaches were used, including establishing trust, counselling on basic 
work attitudes and pro-social behaviour, e-coaching, etc. While the methodology evolved from a 
street-corner approach to a more desk-like approach, the customised aspects remained, as did the 
overarching goal to prevent young low-qualified unemployed persons from becoming long-term 
unemployed and therefore virtually unemployable. The EU Youth Guarantee pushed the Flemish PES 
to step up its efforts and reduce the period for contacting graduates/drop-outs to a maximum of 4 
months. Special attention was to be devoted to the NEET group (Not in Employment, Education or 
Training). This group, which is often not registered in the PES, should be tracked down while they are 
still in school. 
However, some factors did to some extent have a negative effect on the conditions and the gains of 
policy learning in this case. Growing complexity is one of them. Employers complain about the lack of 
transparency due to the wide array of different modes and modules available to young unemployed 
persons for gaining skills, exposure or work experience (internships, individual vocational training, 
apprenticeships, etc.). Another critical factor is the cost of intensive, individual counselling, making it 
an unsustainable practice in the long run. According to some, the absence of low-paying jobs - unlike 
the situation in Germany and the UK - works as an exclusion mechanism for the ‘bottom ten percent’ 
of graduates/drop-outs. Low-paying jobs would mean that the present consensus on minimum wages 
(which must be substantially higher than unemployment benefits) would melt down. 
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Policy learning with regard of the process 
The success of the measure is also due to ‘process factors’. Devolution (transferring labour market 
policy to the regions) created openings for innovation and the PES (VDAB) seized this opportunity. The 
PES was given the chance to evolve in its role of ‘champion’ of the customised guidance approach. The 
Flemish administration had gained experience in using experiments and pilots through ESF projects. 
Also, a tradition had arisen of scientific monitoring, ESF projects as well as the 13 Cities pilots and the 
Youth Employment Plan itself. The PES employed many experts from both the Cabinet and from the 
academic world (who had done much of the monitoring). All this had resulted in a cooperative 
continuum between Cabinet, administration, PES, scientists and academics. This cooperation, due to 
a period of continuity of government composition and absence of controversy, has certainly been 
facilitating and was a catalyst in the development of knowledge and skills with regard to the hard-to-
reach group. Moreover, experiments and tendering were carried out on ‘neutral’ terrain, i.e. with a 
target group of young people ineligible for the ‘acquired rights’ typical for regular employees - and 
protected by the trade unions). 
Still, the success is relative, as youth unemployment is again on the rise. The success of the formula as 
it was applied during the last eight or nine years may obscure the need to search and find other 
formulas which may be more geared toward the present challenges (city ghettos, radicalisation, etc.). 
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2.4. General conclusion 
Summarising the above cases, we end up with three different examples of policy learning in terms of 
extent and quality. 
The first case (Pension Age Reform) was marked by political events (coalition change), preceded by a 
very productive expert commission and to some extent pushed through under pressure from the 
European Commission. Budget austerity was an important driver, and ideology as well as lessons from 
past failed policy were significant factors. In its emergence, the measure was as much an example of 
policy learning as of political learning, whereby the surprise effect and the bypassing of social dialogue 
were striking. 
The second case (adapted availability) came as a ‘trick’ by the government to apply activation for older 
unemployed persons, in particular those retired due to collective redundancies. As outright activation 
of the latter category would mean a severe clash with the trade unions and ‘passive availability’ would 
mean the government would back away from its own principles, a third category was to be invented. 
This face-saving aspect meant that the measure could be qualified as political learning, more than 
policy learning. However, policy learning factors were also present, under the form of the data mining 
capacity of the Flemish PES (allowing for detection of ‘employable’ sub-categories) and the retention 
of acquired rights of those activated and provisionally employed (consequence of experience and 
discussion between the social partners). 
The third case (Youth Employment Plan) is the purest example of policy learning, as it was designed 
and implemented in times of political continuity and preceded by pilots (in turn inspired by ESF 
experiments) and banking on a close cooperation between government cabinet, administration, PES 
and the academic world and the consensus on early intervention to prevent the group of young hard-
to-reach from becoming long-term unemployed. Tendering practices and guidance geared toward the 
characteristics of the specific groups were mainstreamed and the measure, dating from 2008, is still in 
use today. 
Coming back to the hypothesis shown in table 1.2 (page 31), we learned that different forms of policy 
learning could be distinguished and adapted to different circumstances. The controversy of the issue 
as well as the degree of continuity in government (notably the ideological composition) both seem to 
be significant factors, moreover interrelated, for the shape, the requirements and the authorship of 
policy learning. Whereas for commonly understood problems, consensus could be reached by patient 
and in-depth studying, experimenting and piloting, for a highly controversial issue the suddenness of 
the decision is crucial, requiring at the same time a long and discreet preparation for the decision to 
stand the test of time. This means five key requirements and conditions for the policy learning 
infrastructure: 
- A tradition of cooperation and acquaintance between decision makers and knowledge workers 
on domains likely to contain issues and problems to be solved in the medium and long-term; 
- A mechanism to manage controversial issues by delegating them to bodies of knowledge 
which have sufficient authority and impartiality to engineer nuanced and effective solutions; 
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- A continuous mutual feeding between administrative bodies (such as the Ministerial 
Departments and the PES) and the academic world enabling them to produce data and 
scenarios with both insight-driven relevance and empirical evidence; 
- A benchmarking between EU member states not only in terms of figures but also in terms of 
policy mechanisms underscoring measures and societal conditions for measures to have the 
desired effects. 
- Internal dynamics within the nation state between regional authorities in a context of regional 
labour market disparities and devolution of political power.  
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Interview checklist 
1. Respondent’s position in the organization he/she works for & involvement or affinity with the 
issue & policy measure in question. Did the organization play a role in putting the issue on the 
agenda? Or in processing and implementing the measure?  
2. Rationale: the reason why the policy measures have been designed, including the problems to 
be solved, pre-history, proponents and stakeholders, alternatives, intended effects. 
3. Designing mode: bureaucratic proposals, study work, discussion rounds, feasibility 
assessment, monitoring and evaluation plot.  
4. Type of input: ideology, power and lobbying, tradition, or evidence. How evidence-based were 
the decisions? 
5. Circumstantial factors contributing to the measure (changed economics, political and public 
opinions,…) 
6. Who were the initiators: politicians, social partners, knowledge institutions, lobbyists, policy 
advisors…  Who were the opponents, did they influence or alter the final content or format 
of the decisions?  
7. Type of evidence: scientific research, study work and data, failed or successful policy in the 
past, pilots and experiments, terrain experience, international benchmarking, higher 
(international) authority. Who has been delivering this evidence and what was the reason this 
evidence was brought to the fore? 
8. Implementation prospects: costs; counteractions or abuse; skill and cooperativeness 
requirements of bureaucrats, stakeholders and target group. 
9. Use of knowledge: has existing knowledge & know-how been used at fullest or to some extent 
left untapped? Why? 
10. Has the EU been a source of evidence or inspiration?   By advice, genuine research, 
conferences, think tanks, experiments? 
11. Has an evaluation been made since the measure was launched? What does it show? 
12. What is your perception of the measure? (way it was conceived; design; implementation; 
reception by the media and the public; effectiveness…) 
13. What is your perception of the role Europe played in this measure? What is your perception 
of Europe’s role in general?  
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Interviewed persons 
Tom Bevers, Federal Department Employment; Chairman EMCO  
Bart Buysse, Director-General of the Belgian Employers Federation (VBO) 
Jan Denys, Director Communication & Public Affairs, Randstad 
Philippe Diepvents, Advisor of the Socialist Trade Union (ABVV) 
Steven Engels, European Semester, DG Employment 
Dirk Reyntjes, Country Desk Benelux & France, DG Employment 
Debbie Sanders, Advisor Flemish Public Employment Service (PES) 
Chris Serroyen, Head of the Study Department of the Christian Trade Union (ACV ) 
Sonja Teughels, Senior Advisor of the Flemish Employers Federation (VOKA) 
Liesbeth Van Parijs, Researcher HIVA - K.U.Leuven 
Sarah Van Steenkiste, Researcher of Study Support Unit Employment (WSE), KU Leuven.  
Lieven Van Wichelen, Cabinet Home Affairs of the Belgian Federal Government 
Paul Windey, President of the National Labour Council (NAR) 
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